Before Chief Justice Pickering and Justices Hardesty and Cherry. Opinion by Chief Justice Pickering.
In this appeal, the Court considered two issues: (1) the validity of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale when a delinquent-tax certificate or a tax deed encumbers the property; and (2) the ability of the purchaser of such property at the foreclosure sale to redeem the property from a county treasurer. The Court held that a delinquent-tax certificate does not prevent nonjudicial foreclosure because ownership of a property does not transfer when a delinquent-tax certificate issues. Ownership does not even transfer after the two-year statutory period passes without redemption of the property and a county treasurer issues a tax deed of the property. Rather, ownership of a property encumbered by a delinquent-tax certificate or a tax deed remains with the parties who otherwise hold an interest in the property. That interest does not extinguish until “the county gives notice of sale or otherwise finally disposes of the property.” The Court then held that a party who purchases a property at foreclosure sale may redeem it from a county treasurer. The Court clarified that the language in NRS 107.080(5), which states that the purchase at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is without the right of redemption, prevents a debtor from exercising a right of redemption against the purchaser, not a purchaser from later redeeming the property from the county. Affirmed. (Chris Stanko, Summer Law Clerk in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
Showing posts with label Tax. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tax. Show all posts
Thursday, February 14, 2013
Thursday, August 9, 2012
Washoe County v. Otto, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 40 (Aug. 9, 2012)
Before the Court en banc (Justice Pickering recused). Opinion by Justice Hardesty.
In this appeal, another case in the continuing saga of challenges to property taxes in Incline Village, the Court held that a party must strictly comply with the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act naming requirement found at NRS 233B.130(2)(a), as a prerequisite to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction. When a petitioner fails to name in its petition each party of record to the underlying administrative proceedings, the petition is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed. Further, if the petitioner fails to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction by naming the proper parties within the statutory time limit, the petition may not subsequently be amended to cure the jurisdictional defect. Affirmed. (Brent Keele, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP).
In this appeal, another case in the continuing saga of challenges to property taxes in Incline Village, the Court held that a party must strictly comply with the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act naming requirement found at NRS 233B.130(2)(a), as a prerequisite to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction. When a petitioner fails to name in its petition each party of record to the underlying administrative proceedings, the petition is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed. Further, if the petitioner fails to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction by naming the proper parties within the statutory time limit, the petition may not subsequently be amended to cure the jurisdictional defect. Affirmed. (Brent Keele, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP).
Wednesday, November 23, 2011
Chateau Vegas Wine, Inc. v. Southern Wine and Spirits of America, Inc., 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 73 (November 23, 2011)
Before the Court en banc (Justice Parraguirre recused). Opinion by Justice Saitta.
In this appeal from a business court order granting a permanent injunction, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order enjoining Chateau Vegas and Transat Trade (together “Chateau Vegas”) from importing and selling certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes in Nevada. Southern Wine entered into certain agreements that established it as the exclusive importer of certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes in NV. Southern Wine filed the agreements with the Nevada Department of Taxation. In 2002, Southern Wine initiated an action against Chateau Vegas after it learned Chateau Vegas was unlawfully importing and selling French champagnes, and later Bordeaux wines, in Nevada in violation of Southern Wine’s exclusive trade rights pursuant to NRS Chapter 369. Chateau Vegas did not have agreements with the producers of wines and champagne, and the producers’ designated agents, for the importation and sale in Nevada. On appeal, Chateau Vegas argued that Southern Wine failed to strictly comply with the requirements of NRS 369.386 because certain documents were not filed with the Department of Taxation. Chateau Vegas argued that the district court improperly granted injunctive relief because Southern Wine’s exclusive trade rights never vested when it failed to comply with the statute. The Court reviewed the requirements of NRS 369.386 and 369.486 and reiterated that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court gives effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and the Court does not resort to the rules of construction. In finding that Southern Wine, and the related parties to the agreements, complied with the statute’s requirements, the Court noted that NRS 369.386(3) requires a liquor producer acting through an agent to file a “written designation,” and the agent a “written acceptance” of that designation. The Court stated that the statute does not specify a particular filing procedure and noted that, in broad terms, the “written designation” and “written acceptance” must be filed. The Court determined that Southern Wine’s filing of the agreements with the Department of Taxation was sufficient, and declined to read additional requirements into the statutory language. The Court further ruled that injunctive relief was the proper remedy because certain acts by Chateau Vegas (i.e. obtaining the products from other sources and failing to ensure the quality of the products) undermined Southern Wine’s reputation as the primary importer of the liquor in question. The Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Southern Wine established irreparable harm necessary for injunctive relief. Affirmed. (Kristen Gallagher, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson).
In this appeal from a business court order granting a permanent injunction, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order enjoining Chateau Vegas and Transat Trade (together “Chateau Vegas”) from importing and selling certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes in Nevada. Southern Wine entered into certain agreements that established it as the exclusive importer of certain Bordeaux wines and French champagnes in NV. Southern Wine filed the agreements with the Nevada Department of Taxation. In 2002, Southern Wine initiated an action against Chateau Vegas after it learned Chateau Vegas was unlawfully importing and selling French champagnes, and later Bordeaux wines, in Nevada in violation of Southern Wine’s exclusive trade rights pursuant to NRS Chapter 369. Chateau Vegas did not have agreements with the producers of wines and champagne, and the producers’ designated agents, for the importation and sale in Nevada. On appeal, Chateau Vegas argued that Southern Wine failed to strictly comply with the requirements of NRS 369.386 because certain documents were not filed with the Department of Taxation. Chateau Vegas argued that the district court improperly granted injunctive relief because Southern Wine’s exclusive trade rights never vested when it failed to comply with the statute. The Court reviewed the requirements of NRS 369.386 and 369.486 and reiterated that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court gives effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and the Court does not resort to the rules of construction. In finding that Southern Wine, and the related parties to the agreements, complied with the statute’s requirements, the Court noted that NRS 369.386(3) requires a liquor producer acting through an agent to file a “written designation,” and the agent a “written acceptance” of that designation. The Court stated that the statute does not specify a particular filing procedure and noted that, in broad terms, the “written designation” and “written acceptance” must be filed. The Court determined that Southern Wine’s filing of the agreements with the Department of Taxation was sufficient, and declined to read additional requirements into the statutory language. The Court further ruled that injunctive relief was the proper remedy because certain acts by Chateau Vegas (i.e. obtaining the products from other sources and failing to ensure the quality of the products) undermined Southern Wine’s reputation as the primary importer of the liquor in question. The Court affirmed the district court’s finding that Southern Wine established irreparable harm necessary for injunctive relief. Affirmed. (Kristen Gallagher, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson).
Thursday, October 20, 2011
State, Dep’t of Taxation v. Masco Builder, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (October 20, 2011)
Before Saitta, Hardesty and Parraguirre. Per curiam.
In this case involving a taxpayer’s request for a refund, the Court confronted two issues: (1) whether the Nevada Tax Commission (Commission) had improperly substituted its judgment for that of an administrative law judge (ALJ) in reversing the ALJ’s determination that the taxpayer was due a refund; and (2) whether the statute of limitations governing the time within which a taxpayer must file a formal refund request is tolled where the Department of Taxation (Department) has caused the taxpayer to believe that a formal filing was unnecessary. First, the Court noted that the Commission was required to affirm the ALJ’s decision if it was based on substantial evidence. Because the taxpayer, Masco Builder, had presented numerous contracts with customers evidencing its tax status, the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial evidence, which the Commission ignored in reversing the ALJ. Second, the Court applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to hold that Masco could obtain a refund for the entire 2003-2006 period because the Department’s auditor had given Masco false assurances that its refund would not be time-barred, Masco had acted diligently to preserve its rights, Masco had complied with all technical procedures necessary to request a refund, there was no danger of prejudice to the Department because it had already reviewed and rejected Masco’s request for a refund, and justice required that the statute of limitations be tolled because the Department had “actively participated in and contributed to Masco’s delay in formally filing its refund claims.” Affirmed. (Rory Kay, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson)
In this case involving a taxpayer’s request for a refund, the Court confronted two issues: (1) whether the Nevada Tax Commission (Commission) had improperly substituted its judgment for that of an administrative law judge (ALJ) in reversing the ALJ’s determination that the taxpayer was due a refund; and (2) whether the statute of limitations governing the time within which a taxpayer must file a formal refund request is tolled where the Department of Taxation (Department) has caused the taxpayer to believe that a formal filing was unnecessary. First, the Court noted that the Commission was required to affirm the ALJ’s decision if it was based on substantial evidence. Because the taxpayer, Masco Builder, had presented numerous contracts with customers evidencing its tax status, the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial evidence, which the Commission ignored in reversing the ALJ. Second, the Court applied the doctrine of equitable tolling to hold that Masco could obtain a refund for the entire 2003-2006 period because the Department’s auditor had given Masco false assurances that its refund would not be time-barred, Masco had acted diligently to preserve its rights, Masco had complied with all technical procedures necessary to request a refund, there was no danger of prejudice to the Department because it had already reviewed and rejected Masco’s request for a refund, and justice required that the statute of limitations be tolled because the Department had “actively participated in and contributed to Masco’s delay in formally filing its refund claims.” Affirmed. (Rory Kay, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)