Before the Court en banc. Opinion by Justice Douglas.
In this appeal, the Court addressed the preclusive effect of a federal court’s dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a claim when the federal court is sitting in diversity. The Court recognized that its decision in Bower v. Harrah’s Laughlin, 125 Nev. 470, 215 P.3d 718 (2009), needed to be clarified to prevent a conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). The Court clarified that the rule in Bower applies only to decisions of federal courts exercising jurisdiction over federal questions. In cases of diversity jurisdiction, under the Semtek rule, “[d]ecisions rendered when the federal court is sitting in diversity . . . are to be accorded the same claim-preclusive effect as a state court decision in the state in which the federal court sits, unless the state law is ‘incompatible with federal interests.’” 129 Nev. Adv. Op. at 7 (quoting Semtek, 531 U.S. at 507, 508). Because Appellant’s first lawsuit was dismissed in federal court sitting in New Jersey, the Court determined that New Jersey issue-preclusion law should be applied to determine whether her claims in Nevada state court should be precluded. Although the Court determined that the district court erred by applying federal law, it agreed with the result and affirmed the decision pursuant Semtek, its clarification to Bower, and New Jersey law regarding issue preclusion. As an issue of interest to practitioners, the Court also agreed to address the issue of preclusion despite appellant’s failure to raise the issue below to clarify the legal issue raised. Affirmed. (David Stoft, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
Thursday, January 31, 2013
Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 2 (January 31, 2013)
Before the Court en banc. Opinion by Justice Saitta.
In this appeal, the Court dealt with two issues: 1) whether land in question was subject to an easement that the City was entitled to use; and 2) whether the City’s use constituted a taking. In 1956, the federal Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) conveyed property by patent “subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet in width, for roadway and utility purposes.” In 2008, the City designated a 40-foot-wide strip of the property for use in the Cliff Shadows Parkway Improvement Plan. The City planned to use the 33 feet of right-of-way plus an additional 7 feet. The 33-foot easement was the subject of the takings analysis. The district court found that the City was not entitled to use the easement because it was not specifically named in the federal land patent. The district court also determined that the City’s use of the easement constituted a taking and that the easement should be disregarded when calculating just compensation, awarding full market value to the property owner. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed based on its interpretation of the language of the grant and the interpretation of similar language from other jurisdictions, determining that the language of the land patent did create an easement that the City could use. The use of the term “right-of-way” refers to an easement, and the use of “subject to” creates that easement. The Court further stated that any ambiguities in federal land patents are construed in favor of the government. The Court further found that the City’s use of the property was within the scope of the easement, although the interpretation of an easement is strictly construed in favor of the landowner. The property owner unsuccessfully argued that the easement could only be used if the City’s improvements directly benefited the property owner. The Court held that a taking does not occur when the government uses its own previously created easement without exceeding the easement’s scope. The easement existed when the property owner purchased the property. Because the City utilized a valid easement, the Court did not analyze the issue regarding the calculation of just compensation. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. (Joseph P. Schrage, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson).
In this appeal, the Court dealt with two issues: 1) whether land in question was subject to an easement that the City was entitled to use; and 2) whether the City’s use constituted a taking. In 1956, the federal Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) conveyed property by patent “subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 33 feet in width, for roadway and utility purposes.” In 2008, the City designated a 40-foot-wide strip of the property for use in the Cliff Shadows Parkway Improvement Plan. The City planned to use the 33 feet of right-of-way plus an additional 7 feet. The 33-foot easement was the subject of the takings analysis. The district court found that the City was not entitled to use the easement because it was not specifically named in the federal land patent. The district court also determined that the City’s use of the easement constituted a taking and that the easement should be disregarded when calculating just compensation, awarding full market value to the property owner. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed based on its interpretation of the language of the grant and the interpretation of similar language from other jurisdictions, determining that the language of the land patent did create an easement that the City could use. The use of the term “right-of-way” refers to an easement, and the use of “subject to” creates that easement. The Court further stated that any ambiguities in federal land patents are construed in favor of the government. The Court further found that the City’s use of the property was within the scope of the easement, although the interpretation of an easement is strictly construed in favor of the landowner. The property owner unsuccessfully argued that the easement could only be used if the City’s improvements directly benefited the property owner. The Court held that a taking does not occur when the government uses its own previously created easement without exceeding the easement’s scope. The easement existed when the property owner purchased the property. Because the City utilized a valid easement, the Court did not analyze the issue regarding the calculation of just compensation. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. (Joseph P. Schrage, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson).
Education Init. v. Comm. to Protect Nev. Jobs, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 5 (Jan. 31, 2013)
Before the Court en banc. Opinion by Justice Hardesty.
In this appeal, the Court considered the proper standard of review to be applied when reviewing the adequacy of a ballot initiative’s description of effect. NRS 295.009, the statute at issue in this appeal, sets forth two requirements that the proponent of a ballot initiative must satisfy: (1) the proposed law must embrace only “one subject,” and (2) when gathering petition signatures, the proponent’s petitions must include, “in not more than 200 words, a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the initiative or referendum is approved by the voters.” In resolving whether The Education Initiative PAC’s description of effect for its proposed ballot initiative violated NRS 295.009, the Court examined the function of a description of effect in the initiative process and how a court should analyze a description of effect in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the description. The Court also considered whether the initiative violates the single-subject rule. First, the Court found that because a description of effect serves a limited purpose to facilitate the initiative process, a description of effect must be straightforward, succinct, and a nonargumentative summary of what the initiative is designed to achieve and how it intends to reach those goals. Second, the Court found that the description of effect cannot constitutionally be required to delineate every effect that an initiative will have due to its limited purpose and its 200-word limitation. Thus, the Court held that in reviewing an initiative’s description of effect, a district court must take a “holistic approach” to determine whether the description is a straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative summary of an initiative’s purpose and how that purpose is achieved, and must also use that approach to determine whether the information contained in the description is correct and does not misrepresent what the initiative will accomplish and how it intends to achieve those goals. Finally, the Court confirmed that a ballot initiative satisfies the single-subject requirement when the initiative’s proposed parts are “functionally related and germane to each other and the initiative’s purpose of subject.” Affirmed in part and reversed in part. (Amanda C. Yen, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
In this appeal, the Court considered the proper standard of review to be applied when reviewing the adequacy of a ballot initiative’s description of effect. NRS 295.009, the statute at issue in this appeal, sets forth two requirements that the proponent of a ballot initiative must satisfy: (1) the proposed law must embrace only “one subject,” and (2) when gathering petition signatures, the proponent’s petitions must include, “in not more than 200 words, a description of the effect of the initiative or referendum if the initiative or referendum is approved by the voters.” In resolving whether The Education Initiative PAC’s description of effect for its proposed ballot initiative violated NRS 295.009, the Court examined the function of a description of effect in the initiative process and how a court should analyze a description of effect in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the description. The Court also considered whether the initiative violates the single-subject rule. First, the Court found that because a description of effect serves a limited purpose to facilitate the initiative process, a description of effect must be straightforward, succinct, and a nonargumentative summary of what the initiative is designed to achieve and how it intends to reach those goals. Second, the Court found that the description of effect cannot constitutionally be required to delineate every effect that an initiative will have due to its limited purpose and its 200-word limitation. Thus, the Court held that in reviewing an initiative’s description of effect, a district court must take a “holistic approach” to determine whether the description is a straightforward, succinct, and nonargumentative summary of an initiative’s purpose and how that purpose is achieved, and must also use that approach to determine whether the information contained in the description is correct and does not misrepresent what the initiative will accomplish and how it intends to achieve those goals. Finally, the Court confirmed that a ballot initiative satisfies the single-subject requirement when the initiative’s proposed parts are “functionally related and germane to each other and the initiative’s purpose of subject.” Affirmed in part and reversed in part. (Amanda C. Yen, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
Attorney General v. Gypsum Resources, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (Jan. 31, 2013)
Before the Court en banc (Justice Pickering recused). Opinion by Justice Parraguirre.
This case addresses the constitutionality of Nevada Senate Bill No. 358, 72d Leg. (Nev. 2003). The bill relates to rezoning land in certain areas adjacent to Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area (“Red Rock”), including 2,500 acres owned by Respondent. The case was proceeding in federal court and, upon finding no clearly controlling precedent on the state constitutional issues, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified four questions to the Nevada Supreme Court. The questions are: (1) does S.B. 358 violate Art. 4, Sec. 20 of the Nevada Constitution because it is a “local or special law” that “regulat[es] county … business”?; (2) does S.B. 358 violate Art. 4, Sec. 21 of the Nevada Constitution because a general law could have been made “applicable”?; (3) does S.B. 358 violate Art. 4, Sec. 25 of the Nevada Constitution by establishing a “system of County . . . Government” that is not “uniform through the State”?; and (4) if S.B. 358 would otherwise violate Art. 4, Secs. 20, 21, or 25 of the Nevada Constitution, does it fall within an applicable exception and so remain valid? With respect to the first question, the Court establishes two criteria for determining whether a law regulates or affects county business: (1) whether the challenged law governs a single item or project rather than multiple items or projects; and (2) whether the law’s effect is temporary rather than permanent. The Court concludes that S.B. 358 is a local law operating over a particular locality that regulates Clark County’s business by permanently divesting the County of its zoning power over the adjacent lands to Red Rock, and therefore violates the Nevada Constitution. Regarding the second question, the Court states that a law that is either local or special may be upheld where: (1) it does not come within any of the cases enumerated in Art. 4, Sec. 20 of the Nevada Constitution; and (2) a general law could not have been made applicable. The Court concludes that S.B. 358 is a local law and falls within one of Section 20’s enumerated cases and therefore is unconstitutional. With respect to the third question, the Court found that Section 25 of the Nevada Constitution is violated because S.B. 358 divests Clark County of its exclusive control over zoning of lands adjacent to Red Rock. Addressing the last question, the Court concludes that S.B. 358 does not fall within any recognized exception to the Nevada Constitution and thereby remains invalid. Thus, the first three certified questions were answered in the affirmative and the last certified question answered in the negative. (Lisa Wiltshire, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
This case addresses the constitutionality of Nevada Senate Bill No. 358, 72d Leg. (Nev. 2003). The bill relates to rezoning land in certain areas adjacent to Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area (“Red Rock”), including 2,500 acres owned by Respondent. The case was proceeding in federal court and, upon finding no clearly controlling precedent on the state constitutional issues, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified four questions to the Nevada Supreme Court. The questions are: (1) does S.B. 358 violate Art. 4, Sec. 20 of the Nevada Constitution because it is a “local or special law” that “regulat[es] county … business”?; (2) does S.B. 358 violate Art. 4, Sec. 21 of the Nevada Constitution because a general law could have been made “applicable”?; (3) does S.B. 358 violate Art. 4, Sec. 25 of the Nevada Constitution by establishing a “system of County . . . Government” that is not “uniform through the State”?; and (4) if S.B. 358 would otherwise violate Art. 4, Secs. 20, 21, or 25 of the Nevada Constitution, does it fall within an applicable exception and so remain valid? With respect to the first question, the Court establishes two criteria for determining whether a law regulates or affects county business: (1) whether the challenged law governs a single item or project rather than multiple items or projects; and (2) whether the law’s effect is temporary rather than permanent. The Court concludes that S.B. 358 is a local law operating over a particular locality that regulates Clark County’s business by permanently divesting the County of its zoning power over the adjacent lands to Red Rock, and therefore violates the Nevada Constitution. Regarding the second question, the Court states that a law that is either local or special may be upheld where: (1) it does not come within any of the cases enumerated in Art. 4, Sec. 20 of the Nevada Constitution; and (2) a general law could not have been made applicable. The Court concludes that S.B. 358 is a local law and falls within one of Section 20’s enumerated cases and therefore is unconstitutional. With respect to the third question, the Court found that Section 25 of the Nevada Constitution is violated because S.B. 358 divests Clark County of its exclusive control over zoning of lands adjacent to Red Rock. Addressing the last question, the Court concludes that S.B. 358 does not fall within any recognized exception to the Nevada Constitution and thereby remains invalid. Thus, the first three certified questions were answered in the affirmative and the last certified question answered in the negative. (Lisa Wiltshire, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
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