Thursday, September 19, 2013

Vanguard Piping v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 19, 2013)

Before the Court en banc (Justice Parraguirre recused). Opinion by Justice Hardesty.
In this original petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition, petitioners Vanguard Piping Systems, Inc., Viega, LLC, Industries, Inc., and Viega, Inc. (collectively, Vanguard) challenged a district court order compelling Vanguard to produce all insurance policies that might be used to satisfy a judgment against Vanguard in a construction defect action brought by Aventine-Tramonti Homeowners Association (the HOA). Vanguard contended that it was not required to disclose insurance policies purchased by its German parent companies, Viega GmbH and Viega International GmbH, because Vanguard’s primary insurance policies were sufficient to cover any judgment that might be entered against Vanguard. Following the plain language of the rule and applying the federal courts’ interpretation of the similar federal rule, the Court held that NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D) requires parties to disclose any insurance agreement that may be used to satisfy a judgment; “[t]he rule does not mention agreements with policy limits sufficient to satisfy a judgment, nor does it distinguish between primary and secondary insurance policies.” Moreover, permitting parties to determine which insurance agreements are relevant “overlooks the fact that it is impossible to foresee all possible circumstances in which the primary insurance policies will be subject to liability and potentially exhausted by other judgments.” Thus, pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(D), a party is required to disclose all insurance policies that may be liable to pay a portion of a judgment, regardless of whether it has already disclosed policies with limits that exceed its potential liability. Petition denied. (Patrick J. Murch, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)

Loeb v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 62 (Sept. 19, 2013)

Before the Court en banc. Opinion by Justice Hardesty.
In this petition for writ of mandamus, the Court addressed whether a party residing outside of the United States whose foreign address is known may be served by publication pursuant to NRCP 4(e)(1)(i) and (iii), rather than pursuant to the terms of the Hague Service Convention. NRCP 4 permits service upon a defendant who resides outside the state by publishing the summons in a Nevada newspaper and mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant’s residence, if it is known. The Hague Convention, on the other hand, mandates that a party in a foreign country be served either through the central authority of the receiving country, through diplomatic or consular agents that the receiving country considers non-objectionable, or by any method permitted by internal law of the receiving country. Under United States Supreme Court case law, the Hague Convention applies if the state’s service rules require “the transmittal of documents abroad” in order for service to be deemed complete. If the Hague Convention applies, its requirements preempt any inconsistent state law methods of service. Because Petitioners knew the foreign addresses of Real Parties in Interest, Petitioners were required to mail them the documents under NRCP 4(e)(1)(iii). The Court found that under the plain language of NRCP 4(e)(1)(iii), this act constitutes “the transmittal of documents abroad,” triggering the requirements of the Hague Convention. Consequently, the Court held, Petitioners were required to serve Real Parties in Interest pursuant to the requirements of the Hague Convention. Petition denied. (Jeff S. Riesenmy, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)

Congratulations to Matt Addison for his win for the real parties in interest!

State of Nevada v. Tatalovich, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 61 (Sept. 19, 2013)

Before the Court en banc. Opinion by Chief Justice Pickering.
In this opinion, the Court considered whether services performed for the purposes of developing and providing expert opinion testimony in a civil case required a private investigator’s license under NRS 648.060. Appellant, State of Nevada Private Investigator’s Licensing Board (the “Board”) cited Respondents for engaging in the business of a private investigator without a Nevada license. Dwayne Tatalovich was hired as an expert witness and in preparation for such testimony, performed several functions which, as the Board asserted, constituted activities of a private investigator. The Court explained that, in Nevada, a person engaging in the business of a private investigator (as defined by NRS 648.012) must obtain a license to do so; however, the Court noted that such licensing restrictions exist to protect the public from unqualified individuals who lack the skills necessary to perform the tasks of professionals in that field. Furthermore, the Court emphasized, such policies are not served by applying the licensing requirements to experts whose credibility and qualifications are tested in court and subject to a separate set of rules. As such, the Court determined that the licensing scheme set forth in NRS 648.060 was never intended to encompass the conduct of expert witnesses performing tasks in preparation for testimony before a court. Importantly, the Court highlighted that, after the Respondents were cited by the Board, the Legislature amended the language of NRS 648.012 to specifically exempt expert witnesses from the licensing requirements of NRS 648.060. Thus, the Court concluded that expert witnesses are not required to obtain licenses to perform investigative work in preparation for developing and giving expert opinion testimony. Affirmed. (Amanda Perach, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)