Before Justices Douglas, Hardesty, and Parraguirre. Opinion by Justice Douglas.
In this appeal from an order granting summary judgment in an insurance coverage action, the Court interpreted coverage limitations and exclusions in an “all risks” policy. Appellant, the owner of a building in Las Vegas, had roof repairs done to the building. Before the repairs were completed, Las Vegas had an unexpected and substantial rainstorm that caused significant damage to the building. Respondent denied coverage because the policy limited coverage for damage caused by rain to circumstances where the roof first sustained damage by wind or hail and excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. The Court defined “roof” as “sufficiently durable to meet its intended purpose: to cover and protect a building against weather-related risks that reasonably may be anticipated,” and held that tarps that were used as temporary protection of the roof only after the rain began did not fit within that definition. The Court further concluded that “faulty workmanship” was not ambiguous and included both faulty products and processes. Having rejected both arguments that the potential causes of damage were covered by the policy, the Court nonetheless considered and adopted the doctrine of efficient proximate cause, which allows for recovery under an insurance policy if a covered cause of loss is the predominant cause of the loss even if a non-covered cause contributed to the loss. Because none of the asserted causes of the damage were covered under the policy, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the insurance company. Affirmed. (Kerry S. Doyle, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
