Before the Court En Banc (Justice Pickering recused). Opinion by Justice Parraguirre. Concurrence by Justice Gibbons, joined by Justice Cherry.
In this published order denying a motion for remand, the Court considered whether a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action, pursuant to its statutory authority, after having paid just compensation and after entry of a final order of condemnation, but before the issues pending on appeal are resolved. The Court reviewed NRS 37.180(1) to determine the circumstances under which a plaintiff may abandon a condemnation. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that a plaintiff may abandon the condemnation proceeding so long as no more than thirty days had passed since entry of final judgment, which occurs after an appeal in a condemnation action. Thus, even if the plaintiff takes title to the property and pays the amount of the judgment for just compensation, the plaintiff may abandon the condemnation proceeding while other related issues, such as property valuation, are pending on appeal. Concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to abandon the condemnation proceeding, the Court considered whether a district court had jurisdiction to dismiss the action upon the plaintiff’s filing of a notice of abandonment and motion to vacate the judgment (which is treated as a motion to dismiss under NRS 37.180). The Court acknowledged that a notice of appeal generally divests the district court of jurisdiction for non-collateral matters; however, the Court noted that the language contained in NRS 37.180 provides that abandonment of a condemnation proceeding may occur “at any time” between the filing of the complaint and thirty days after entry of a final judgment. The statute also requires the district court to dismiss the proceeding upon the motion of any party after a notice of abandonment is filed. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the district court retains limited jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal to consider a motion to dismiss/motion to vacate judgment filed pursuant to a plaintiff’s notice of abandonment in a condemnation action. As such, the Court denied the motion for remand as moot. Concurring in the order denying the motion to remand, Justices Gibbons and Cherry emphasized the facts that indicated the plaintiff may be equitably stopped from abandoning the proceedings under these circumstances. Motion denied as moot. (Amanda M. Perach, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson).
