Before Justices Saitta, Pickering, and Hardesty. Opinion by Justice Hardesty.
In this appeal, the Court considered two issues regarding contractual indemnity clauses: (1) whether the district court erred in finding that a contractual indemnity clause limiting the indemnitor’s duty to defend “to the extent caused in whole or in part by the negligent acts or omissions or other fault of [the indemnitor]” did not require a determination that the indemnitor cause an injury before triggering the duty to indemnify and (2) whether the district court erred in finding that the indemnitor had a duty to defend regardless of the ultimate determination of cause and was entitled to attorney fees in the amount of the defense. As to the first issue, the Court concluded that contractual indemnity clauses containing “to the extent caused” language “must be strictly construed as limiting an indemnitee’s losses only to the extent the injuries were caused by the indemnitor.” Here, because the jury found that the indemnitor was not at fault for the underlying injury at issue in the case, the indemnitor had no duty to indemnify. The Court further held that, for the same reason, the indemnitor was not required to defend the indemnitee for its own negligence where the indemnitor was not found to have caused the injury. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees for defending the underlying action was improper. Reversed. (Seth T. Floyd, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
