Before Chief Justice Pickering and Justices Hardesty and Saitta. Opinion per curiam.
In this petition for writ of mandamus, the Court considered the time period in which a party must file a peremptory challenge. The Real Party in Interest, Kourtney Morrow (“Kourtney”), filed a complaint for divorce from Petitioner Craig Morrow (“Craig”) and a contemporaneous motion for child custody in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Kourtney properly served Craig with the summons, complaint and motion on April 20, 2012. On May 4, 2012, Craig entered an appearance and filed a peremptory challenge. The clerk then reassigned the matter to Judge Cynthia Dianne Steel. Judge Steel rejected the peremptory challenge finding it had not been filed within the 10-day period prescribed by SCR 48.1. Craig then filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the district court’s rejection of his peremptory challenge. The Court examined the appropriateness of a writ in these circumstances, and held that an extraordinary writ petition is an appropriate means to challenge district court decisions concerning peremptory challenges. The Court then examined the time period within which to file a peremptory challenge under SCR 48.1(3), which states that “the peremptory challenge shall be filed: (a) within 10 days after notification to the parties of a trial or hearing date; or (b) not less than 3 days before the date set for the hearing of any contested pretrial matter, whichever occurs first.” The Court held that the 10-day time period begins to run upon proper notice of a hearing, and that proper notice in this case occurred when Craig was properly served with the summons, complaint and motion. The Court further held that that 10-day time period may expire regardless of whether a party has appeared in the action, and regardless of the 20-day period in this case for Craig to respond to the summons and complaint. Finally, the Court held that the computation rules in NRCP 6 controlled the computation of time under SCR 48.1(3), meaning that because the 10-day period under SCR 48.1(3) was less than 11 days, intermediate weekends and holidays should be excluded in computing the 10-day period. Based on this computation, the Court held that Craig’s peremptory challenge was timely filed on the tenth day, May 4, 2012. Writ Granted. (Megan Starich, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson.)
