Before Justices Cherry, Gibbons and Pickering. Opinion by Justice Pickering.
In this appeal, the Court clarified the doctrine of quantum meruit, ultimately affirming a district court judgment concluding that there was no express or implied contract and that there had been no benefit conferred on the defendant. The Court explained that quantum meruit “is a cause of action in two fields: restitution and contract.” Essentially, it is a measure of damages that can be used to determine the amount of restitution under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment or an award of damages under the legal theory of implied contract. Relative to an “implied-in-fact” contract, “a party may invoke quantum meruit as a gap-filler to supply the absent term” of the price to be paid for the good or service after it is determined that “the parties intended to contract and promises were exchanged, the general obligations for which must be sufficiently clear.” In affirming the lower court, the Court determined as to appellant “there there was no contract, express or implied, for the design related work standing alone” and “too many gaps to fill in the asserted contract for quantum meruit to take hold.” Moving to the claim as based on “restitution” the Court explained that a litigant “must establish each element of unjust enrichment.” In that regard, the Court required a showing that the respondent received a benefit from the services provided by the appellant, but clarified that a “benefit” is “not confined to the retention of money or property,” it can include “services beneficial to or at the request of the other” and “denotes any form of advantage.” (internal quotations omitted). Because the appellant had not conveyed a benefit to the respondent, the Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that there had been no unjust enrichment. Finally, the Court addressed respondent’s claim for attorneys’ fees under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 or NRS 108.237, the Court determined that it is not necessary for the district court to make express findings as to each of the Beatty factors in using its discretion to award or deny attorneys fees under NRCP 68 and/or NRS 17.115. As to respondent’s request for fees under NRS 108.237, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of those fees despite there being no explicit finding as to the request for fees under NRS 108.237, finding that the record supported a finding that appellant had “a reasonable basis” for its claims. Affirmed. (David J. Stoft, Associate in the Las Vegas office of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP).
