Before Justices Cherry, Gibbons, and Pickering. Opinion by Justice Cherry.
In this appeal, the Court held that a claim for fraudulent inducement is barred as a matter of law if the claim directly contradicts the terms of the written contract. The Court based its conclusion on principles underlying the parol evidence rule and broadly suggested that any claim that is contrary to the written terms of a complete contract would be barred as a matter of law. In addressing compensatory damages for the claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Court reiterated that damages for breach of contract should include lost profit or expectancy damages. The Court allowed the award of lost profits for work that had been performed despite the fact that the contract was terminable at will, distinguishing a case that prevented the recovery of lost future profits when a contract is terminable at will. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. (Kerry S. Doyle, Associate in the Reno office of McDonald Carano Wilson LLP).
